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  We develop an analytically tractable Phillips curve based on state-dependent 
pricing. We differ from the existing literature by considering a local approximation 
around a zero inflation steady state and introducing idiosyncratic shocks. The resulting 
Phillips curve is a simple variation of the conventional time-dependent Calvo formulation 
but with some important differences. First, the model is able to match the micro evidence 
on both the magnitude and timing of price adjustments. Second, holding constant the 
frequency of price adjustment, our state-dependent model exhibits greater flexibility in 
the aggregate price level than does the time-dependent model. On the other hand, with 
real rigidities present, our state-dependent pricing framework can exhibit considerable 
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In recent years there has been considerable progress in developing structural models of inﬂation and
output dynamics. A common aspect of this approach is to begin with the individual ﬁrm’s price
setting problem, obtain optimal decision rules, and then aggregate behavior. The net result is a simple
relation for inﬂation that is much in the spirit of a traditional Phillips curve: Inﬂation depends on a
measure of real activity as well as expectations of the future. In addition to its forward-looking nature,
this relationship also diﬀers from the traditional Phillips curve in that all the coeﬃcients are explicit
functions of the primitives of the model.
To date, these new Phillips curves (often grouped under the heading of “New Keynesian”) reﬂect
a pragmatic compromise between theoretical rigor and the need for empirical tractability.1 While they
evolve from optimization at the ﬁrm level, they typically restrict pricing behavior to time-dependent
strategies where the frequency of adjustment is given exogenously. A leading alternative, of course,
is state-dependent pricing, where the ﬁrm is free to adjust whenever it would like, subject to a ﬁxed
adjustment cost. This latter approach, however, leads to “Ss” pricing policies which are, in general,
diﬃcult to aggregate.2 For this reason, the time-dependent approach has proven to be the most popular,
despite the unattractiveness of arbitrarily ﬁx i n gt h ed e g r e eo fp r i c er i g i d i t y .
Besides tractability considerations, however, there have been two additional justiﬁcations for the
time-dependent approach. First, Klenow and Kryvtsov (2005; KK) have shown that, during the recent
low inﬂation period in the United States, the fraction of ﬁrms that adjust their prices in any given
quarter has been reasonably stable, which is certainly consistent with time-dependent pricing. Second,
in this spirit, it is often conjectured that time-dependent models are the natural reduced forms of a
state-dependent framework for economies with relatively stable inﬂation. Indeed KK provide support
for these notions by showing that a conventional state-dependent pricing model (Dotsey, King and
Wolman, 1999; DKW) and a conventional time-dependent model (Calvo, 1983) yield very similar
dynamics when calibrated to recent U.S. data.
A interesting recent paper by Golosov and Lucas (2003; GL) challenges this rationalization. The
authors ﬁrst note that to reconcile the evidence on the large size of individual ﬁrm price adjustments in
the KK data with the low US inﬂation rate, it is necessary to introduce idiosyncratic shocks that create
suﬃcient dispersion in price adjustments. They then observe that in this environment, even if price
adjustment frequencies are stable (due to moderate inﬂation variability), there remains an important
diﬀerence between state dependence and time dependence: Under state-dependent pricing, the ﬁrms
that ﬁnd themselves farthest away from their target price adjust, whereas under time dependence
there is no such relation. The authors then go on to show numerically that within a state-dependent
1Examples include Gali and Gertler (1999), Gali, Gertler, and Lopez-Salido (2001), Sbordone, (2002), and Eichenbaum
and Fisher (2004).
2See Caplin and Spulber (1987), Caplin and Leahy (1991,1997), Benabou (1988), and Caballero and Engel (1991) for
early analyses of dynamic Ss economies. Dotsey, King, and Wolman (1999) place Ss policies within a standard dynamic
stochastic general equilibrium model.
2model with idiosyncratic productivity shocks, an exogenous shock to the money supply has a much
stronger eﬀect on the price level and a much weaker eﬀect on real output than it does within a
standard time-dependent model calibrated to have a similar degree of price stickiness at the ﬁrm level.
In particular, they ﬁnd that the “selection” eﬀect associated with state-dependent pricing may lead
to quantitatively important diﬀerences with time-dependent pricing models. Overall, their numerical
exercise is reminiscent of the theoretical example in Caplin and Spulber (1987), where state dependence
can turn the non-neutrality of money resulting from time dependence on its head.
Because pricing behavior in their model is very complex, GL restrict attention to numerical so-
lutions, as is typical in the Ss literature. In addition, they keep the other model features as simple
as possible. Perhaps most signiﬁcant, they abstract from interactions among ﬁrms that can lead to
strategic complementarities in price setting. These complementarities - known in the literature as
“real rigidities” - work to enhance the overall nominal inertia that a model of infrequent nominal price
adjustment can deliver.3 It is now well known, for example, that to obtain an empirically reasonable
degree of nominal stickiness within a time-dependent price framework, it is critical to introduce real
rigidities. Accordingly, abstracting from real rigidities makes it diﬃcult to judge in general whether
state dependence undoes the results of the conventional literature.
Our paper addresses this controversy by developing a simple state-dependent pricing model that
allows for both idiosyncractic shocks and real rigidities. Accordingly, we diﬀer from the existing Ss lit-
erature by making assumptions that deliver a model that is as tractable as the typical time-dependent
framework. As with the standard time-dependent frameworks and the DKW state-dependent frame-
work, we focus on a local approximation around the steady state. We diﬀer from DKW by introducing
idiosyncratic shocks, as in GL. We diﬀer from GL, in turn, by introducing several restrictions and tech-
nical assumptions that permit an approximate analytical solution. The end result is a Phillips curve
built up explicitly from state-dependent pricing at the micro level that is comparable in simplicity and
tractability to the standard New Keynesian Phillips curve that arises from the time-dependent pricing.
Because we restrict attention to a local approximation around a zero inﬂation steady state, our
analysis is limited to economies with low and stable inﬂation. We thus cannot use our Ss framework to
analyze the eﬀect of large regime changes (which, of course is also a limitation of the time-dependent
approach.) On the other hand, our framework does capture the “selection” eﬀect of state-dependent
pricing: those farthest away from target tend to adjust more frequently, a feature that need not
arise in time-dependent pricing. We can thus use our model to assess quantitatively how much extra
price ﬂexibility state dependence adds relative to time dependence, after allowing for the kinds of real
rigidities thought to be important in the time-dependent literature.
In section 2 we lay out the basic features of the model: a simple New Keynesian framework, but
with state-dependent as opposed to time-dependent pricing. Firms face idiosyncratic productivity
3Ball and Romer (1990) ﬁrst noted that for sticky price models to generate suﬃcient nominal inertia, real rigidities
are critical. See Woodford (2003) for a recent discussion.
3shocks, but we diﬀer from GL by assuming that at any moment in time, there is a spatial nature to the
idiosyncractic shock; i.e., at any moment only a subset of the economy is hit by the turbulence from
idiosyncratic shocks. In addition, following Danziger (1999), we restrict the distribution of idiosyncratic
shocks to be uniform. As we show, the latter restriction greatly simpliﬁes the aggregation of Ss
policies, while the former permits the resulting Phillips curve to be as ﬂexible in parametric form as
the conventional New Keynesian Phillips curve.
In section 3 we characterize the ﬁrm’s optimal pricing policy. We make assumptions on the size of
the adjustment costs that make it reasonable to restrict attention to a second-order approximation of
the ﬁrm’s objective function. We then turn to the key theoretical result that makes the Ss problem
tractable. Given the uniform distribution of idiosyncratic shocks, a ﬁrm adjusting at time t can ignore
the future states of the world where an idiosyncratic shocks hits, up to a second order. Put diﬀerently,
up to a second order, the ﬁrms’s continuation value conditional on an idiosyncratic shock at t +1is
independent of its price at t. As we show, this “simpliﬁcation” theorem makes the state-dependent
pricing problem as easy to solve as the conventional time-dependent pricing problem. We then proceed
to derive an approximate analytical solution, which includes deriving loglinear expressions for both the
target price and the set of Ss bands.
In section 4 we characterize the complete model and present a log-linear approximation about the
steady state. Among other things, we derive a Phillips curve relation that is very similar in form to
the New Keynesian Phillips curve, except of course that it is based on state-dependent pricing. As we
discuss in section 5, a distinctive feature of our Phillips curve is that the key primitive parameter that
enters the slope coeﬃcient on the real activity measure (typically real marginal cost) is the Poisson
arrival process for the idiosyncratic shock, as opposed to the measure of the degree of price rigidity
that enters the standard formulation. The reason for this diﬀerence is that in within our framework,
the frequency of price adjustment is endogenous and cannot be taken as a model primitive. As we
show, further, because the frequency of the idiosyncratic shock will in general exceed the frequency
of price adjustment, our state-dependent Phillips curve will exhibit greater price ﬂexibility than the
corresponding time-dependent relation. As in GL, the selection eﬀect is at work: Firms that receive
an idiosyncratic shock but do not adjust have a price that is already close to the target. On the other
hand, because we can allow for real rigidities, our state-dependent framework is nonetheless capable of
delivering considerable nominal stickiness.
In section 6 we calibrate the model to match the KK evidence on the frequency and absolute
magnitude of price adjustments and also evidence on the costs of price adjustment. We then show that
the framework can deliver the kind of aggregate price-level stickiness emphasized in the time-dependent
literature and yet remain consistent with the microeconomic evidence on price adjustment. Key to this
result, as we show, is allowing for real rigidities. Concluding remarks are in section 7.
42. Model: Environment
We begin with a conventional New Keynesian model. The basic features of the standard model include
monopolistic competition, money, and nominal price stickiness. Also, for convenience, there are only
consumption goods. To this familiar baseline framework we add three features: real rigidities, idiosyn-
cratic productivity shocks and state-dependent pricing. It is of course incorporating this latter feature
that poses the biggest challenge.
In particular, state-dependent pricing raises two diﬃcult modelling issues. The ﬁrst is the need to
conserve on state variables. In the most general state-dependent pricing model, the entire distribution of
prices relative to the optimum is a state variable. This gives rise to an intractable ﬁxed-point problem.
Inevitably, there is a need for some kind of simplifying assumptions or short cuts. Our strategy will be
to make restrictions on the distribution of idiosyncratic shocks to simplify the distributional dynamics.4
We borrow our distributional assumption from Danziger (1999), who by assuming a uniform distribution
of shocks was able to solve a carefully parameterized Ss economy in closed form. As we show, however,
the eﬀects of money on output are small (i.e. second order and above) for the case he is able to solve. We
diﬀer from Danziger by allowing for a more ﬂexible parameterization of the model in which signiﬁcant
nominal inertia and hence a signiﬁcant ﬁrst order eﬀect of money on output is possible. Though we
cannot solve for an exact solution, we can obtain an approximate analytical solution by consideration
a local expansion of the model around a zero inﬂation steady state (as is done in the time-dependent
literature - see, e.g., Woodford (2003)).
The second modelling issue arises from the discontinuities and non-diﬀerentiabilities associated with
in Ss adjustment. This issue potentially complicates ﬁnding a loglinear approximation of the model,
since Taylor’s theorem does not apply to functions that are not diﬀerentiable. Fortunately, as we
discuss, this technical problem is applicable to only a small percentage of ﬁrms that happen to lie
near the Ss bands and have not faced an idiosyncratic shock in the recent past. Since the bands tend
to be wide relative to the aggregate shock, only these ﬁrms are potentially motivated to adjust their
prices in response to the aggregate shock. We address the issue by assuming that in addition to the
ﬁxed cost of adjusting the price, there is a small “decision cost” to contemplating a price adjustment
cost prior to the decision whether to adjust. This assumption, together with the assumption that
aggregate shocks are small relative idiosyncratic shocks, guarantees that ﬁrms only consider adjusting
when idiosyncratic shocks hit.5 It leads to smooth behavior of ﬁrms as they approach the Ss bands,
eliminating any complications to linearizing our model. In an appendix we conﬁrm that this decision
4Caplin and Spulber (1987), Caplin and Leahy (1991, 1997), and Benabou (1988) also make distributional assumptions
that reduce the state space. DKW make assumptions that limit the number of prices observed in the economy to a ﬁnite
number. Willis (2002) follows Krussel and Smith (1988) and approximates the distribution by a ﬁnite number of moments.
GL avoid the ﬁxed point problem by setting variables (except for the wage which they take to be exogenous) at their
steady state values when computing ﬁrm decision rules.
5Note that a ﬁrm may or may not adjust in the wake of an idiosyncratic shock. Thus the price adjustment frequency
is endogenous and not simply tied to the frequency of idiosyncratic shocks. Indeed, in general the former will be smaller
than the latter.
5cost need only be very tiny and that setting the decision cost to zero has only a minor eﬀect on the
dynamics of the model.
In the remainder of this section we lay out the basic ingredients of model. There are three types of
agents: households, ﬁnal goods ﬁrms, and intermediates goods ﬁrms. We describe each in turn.
2.1. Households
Households consume, supply labor, hold money, and hold bonds. The latter are zero in net supply. We
assume a segmented labor market in order to generate strategic complementarities in price setting as
in Woodford (2003). In particular, we assume a continuum of “islands” of mass unity. On each island,
there is a continuum of households of mass unity. Households can only supply labor on the island that
they live. There is perfect consumption insurance across islands, and any ﬁrm proﬁts are redistributed
lump sum to households.
Time is discrete and indexed by t.L e t Ct be consumption; Mt nominal money balances; Pt the
nominal price index; Nz,t labor supply on island z; Wz,t the nominal wage on island z; Γz,t lump sum
transfers (including insurance, dividends, and net taxes); Bt one period nominal discount bonds; and
Rn
t+1 the nominal interest rate from t to t +1 . Then the objective for a representative household on





























t )Bt − Bt−1
Pt
(2.2)
We index labor supply and the nominal wage by z because the island z labor market is segmented.
Since there is perfect consumption insurance, there is no need to similarly index the other variables,
except for lump sum transfers, which may be island-speciﬁc.





























62.2. Final goods ﬁrms
Production occurs in two stages. Monopolistically competitive intermediate ﬁrms employ labor to
produce input for ﬁnal goods. There is a continuum of mass unity of these intermediate goods ﬁrms on
each island. Final goods ﬁrms package together all the diﬀerentiated intermediate inputs to produce
output. These ﬁrms are competitive and operate across all islands.
Let Yt be output of the representative ﬁnal good ﬁrm; Y
j
z,t be input from intermediate goods
producer j on island z;a n dP
j
z,t be the associated nominal price. The production function for ﬁnal














where ε>1 is the price elasticity of demand for each intermediate good:























2.3. Intermediate goods ﬁrms










z,t is an idiosyncratic productivity factor for producer j on island z. (For simplicity we abstract
from aggregate productivity shocks, though we can easily add them.)
Islands are occasionally subject to turbulence in the form of multiplicative i.i.d. productivity shocks.
These shocks follow a compound Poisson process. The arrival of the shock on island z at date t (i.e.,
whether ﬁrms are subject to a draw from random productivity variable at t) is perfectly correlated
across all ﬁrms on the island and independent of shocks to other islands. The realization of the draw,
however, is uncorrelated across ﬁrms on the island. Speciﬁcally, let ξ
j
z,t,d e n o t et h es h o c kt oﬁrm j on














7We assume that the productivity shock arrives with probability 1 − α and that conditional on arrival
the random variable ξ
j
z,t is distributed uniformly with density 1/φ such that
E{e(ε−1)ξ} =1
As will become obvious, this normalization ensures that the expected multiplicative impact of the shock
on the ﬁrm’s discounted proﬁts is unity. In addition, we assume that the support of ξ
j
z,t is suﬃciently
large relative to the steady state Ss band. Let ω denote the absolute value of the log deviation of the
each band from the target price in steady state. We assume:
φ>4ω (2.11)
As illustrated by Danziger (1999), the uniform distribution satisfying (2.11) introduces considerable
tractability to the general Ss problem. The distribution of prices following an idiosyncratic shock
has a simple form: uniform within the adjustment triggers and a mass at the target. As we show,
this feature makes possible a reasonably simple approximation of the solution to the decision problem.
It also simpliﬁes the steady state equilibrium, as well as the local approximation around the steady
state.6,7













We scale the adjustment cost be the factor (X
j
z,t)ε−1 to keep the ﬁrm’s decision problem homogenous
as it size varies.8 This adjustment cost is in units of the ﬁnal consumption good.
The ﬁxed cost b will lead to Ss style price adjustment policies. There will be a range of inaction in
which ﬁrms keep their price ﬁxed. Firms with prices outside of this range will adjust to a new optimum.
As noted earlier, Ss policies lead naturally to non-diﬀerentiabilities that make linearization diﬃcult.
In our case, this problem arises with ﬁrms close to the boundaries of the range of inaction that do not
receive an indiosyncratic shock. For these ﬁrms an aggregate shock in one direction will cause some
of these ﬁrms to adjust, whereas a shock in the other direction will take all of them deeper into the
inaction region. There is therefore a kink in the response of these ﬁrms to the aggregate state.
Since the aggregate shock will be small, this non-diﬀerentiability arises among a small number of
6The steady state gap between the upper and lower adjustment triggers will be 2ω. Since the shock is mean zero in
logs it must have a support greater than twice this amount in order to take a ﬁrm at the upper trigger below the lower
trigger. The inequality implies that this condition is met in a neighborhood of the steady state.
7Note that our shock process is only conditionally uniform. With our Poisson assumption, the ex ante distribution of
shocks combines a mass at zero with the wide uniform distribution.
8If the economy were growing we would also have to normalize the cost of price adjustment by the real wage and
aggregate output.
8ﬁrms. Moreover, since these ﬁrms lie near the boundary of the inaction region, they are essentially
indiﬀerent between adjustment and non-adjustment. Our solution to the diﬀerentiability problem is to
add a small decision cost so that these ﬁrms never choose to adjust in response to an aggregate shock.
We assume the following: Firms know when idiosyncratic turbulence hits their island, but to gather
information about the precise value of the shock ξ they receive and the state of the economy and to
also organize this information to contemplate a price adjustment, they must pay a small decision cost,
d · (X
j
z,t)ε−1.I faﬁrm elects to pay the decision cost, it then can decide whether to adjust price. If it
chooses to adjust, then it also incurs the ﬁxed cost b(X
j
z,t)ε−1. We make assumptions that guarantee















As the appendix shows, the upper bound ensures that the ﬁrm wishes to pay the decision cost when-
ever it observes the arrival of the idiosyncratic shock.9 The lower bound ensures that there exists a
neighborhood of the steady state in which ﬁrms choose not to pay d whenever the idiosyncratic shock
does not arrive.
We emphasize that the main justiﬁcation for introducing the decision cost is that it solves a par-
ticular technical problem that arises in the log-linearization, and by doing so yields a simple solution
to a complex aggregation problem. In the appendix we present a numerical solution to a version of
the model that omits the decision cost and show that it yields dynamics nearly identical to those of
our baseline model that includes the decision costs. Intuitively, since we will be considering only small
perturbations about steady state, the decision cost only aﬀects a small number of ﬁrms near the Ss
bands, and only aﬀects the aggregate dynamics through the eﬀe c tt h a tt h e s eﬁrms have on the price
level. For the remainder of the paper we only need to keep the implication that a ﬁrm contemplates
price adjustment if and only if it observes the arrival of the idiosyncratic shock.
2.4. The monetary shock
We close the model with an exogenous stationary process for either the money supply or the nominal
interest rate. We present the exact form of this process when we discuss the complete linearized model.
9To calculate the amount that a ﬁrm is willing to pay to ﬁnd out the state, consider a ﬁrm whose price is at the
frictionless optimum and receives an idiosyncratic productivity shock. We will see below that the loss from non-adjustment
is approximately equal to (ε − 1)ξ
2. We integrate this loss over the region of price adjustment [−φ/2,−ω]∪[ω,φ/2] using
the density 1/φ, and subtract the cost of price adjustment. 1 − αβ comes from taking the present value until the next
price adjustment. All other initial conditions create greater gains to learning.
93. The Firm’s Optimal Pricing Decision
Given the ﬁxed cost of price adjustment, the solution to the ﬁrm’s optimal policy will involve an Ss-
style of price adjustment. Speciﬁcally, there will be a range of inaction, where the gain in discounted
earnings from adjusting is not suﬃcient to cover the ﬁxed cost. The optimal policy will involve an
upper trigger, a lower trigger, and a target price. The ﬁrm adjusts when its price either reaches or
moves beyond either of the trigger prices.
In this section we ﬁrst characterize the ﬁrm’s objective function. We argue that based on a plausible
assumption about the size of the adjustment cost b, it is reasonable to consider a second order approxi-
mation of the objective function. We then show that our restriction on adjustment costs in conjunction
with the uniform distribution of the shock, leads to considerable simpliﬁcation of the objective, up to
a second order. With this simpliﬁed objective, we characterize both the steady state and a log-linear
approximation of the decision rules about the steady state.
Before continuing with the ﬁrm’s problem it is useful to state the following lemma which is proved
in an appendix.
Lemma 3.1. Given the assumption on the decision cost d, there exists a neighborhood of the non-
stochastic steady state in which the ﬁrm pays the decision cost if and only if the ﬁrm experiences an
idiosyncratic shock.
The intuition behind the lemma is straightforward. At the beginning of the period the ﬁrm only
initiates the price adjustment process if the gains justify the total cost (b + d)Xε−1.10 After paying
the cost d,t h eﬁrm adjusts if the gains outweigh the menu cost bXε−1. Hence the range of inertia
in the ﬁrst phase is greater than the range of inertia in the second. The ﬁrm only initiates the price
adjustment process if there is an event big enough that there is a good chance it is taken outside the
larger bands. Given the assumption that the idiosyncratic shocks are much larger than the aggregate
shocks, the ﬁrm reacts to the former but not the latter. The full problem of the ﬁrm is solved in the
appendix.
In the next section, we appeal to the lemma and impose that the ﬁrm adjusts its price only in
response to the idiosyncratic shock. This simpliﬁes the exposition by eliminating the decision cost d
from the discussion.
3.1. The Firm’s Objective
Real proﬁts net of adjustment costs, ˜ Π
j
t+i,a r eg i v e nb y
10Zbaracki et al. (2004) ﬁnd that the managerial costs of information gathering and decision making d are much larger
than the physical costs of adjusting prices b. Fabiani et al. (2004) ﬁnd that ﬁrms in the Euro area review their prices
















where bt+i is deﬁned by equation (2.12). Note that from cost minimization, the ﬁrm’s real marginal
cost is Wz,t+i/Xz,t+i.
It is convenient to deﬁne the “normalized” price, Q
j
z,t, which is the price, P
j
z,t, normalized by

















There are two advantages of working with the normalized price. First, assuming that the ﬁrm’s desired
markup is stationary, Q
j
z,t is stationary. In contrast P
j
z,t is nonstationary since X
j
z,t is nonstationary.
Second, all ﬁrms that reset their price in period t will wind up choosing the same normalized price,
which simpliﬁes the aggregation. Since idiosyncratic productivity diﬀers across ﬁrms, ﬁrms will not
choose the same absolute price. Note that because Q
j
z,t depends on X
j
z,t, it may change even if the ﬁrm
keeps its nominal price constant.
Restating period proﬁts in terms of the normalized price and making use the demand function the
ﬁrm faces (equation (2.7)) yields


















At this point we drop the j,z subscripts. It is useful to deﬁne the variable At+i = Pε−1
t+i Yt+i and
Λt,t+i = U0(Ct+i)/U0(Ct).W ed e ﬁne the ﬁrm’s value function as the maximized stream of discounted
net proﬁts, as follows:














V depends on the normalized price inherited from the previous period. We write this price as Qt−1eξt
with the understanding that ξt =0when there is no idiosyncratic productivity shock. V also depends
on Ωt which summarizes the aggregate state of the economy, which depends on the current values of
Ct,Y t,W t,a n dPt, as well as their future evolution.
Given that gross proﬁts and adjustment costs are homogeneous in Xε−1
t , it is convenient to deﬁne
11the normalized value function v(·):
V (Qt−1eξt,Ωt)=Xε−1










t+i(Qt+i − Wt+i) − bt+i]

















Given all our assumptions, what complicates the ﬁrm’s problem, in general, is that it must take





sent this consideration, the choice of the target price at time t would just involve taking into account
discounted proﬁts in states where the ﬁrm’s price remains ﬁxed at its period t target. In this respect,
the choice of the target is no more diﬃcult than in the conventional time-dependent framework. The
choice of the triggers also simpliﬁes.





of the ﬁrm’s period t choice of the target, up to a second order approximation. The decision problem
will then simplify, along the lines we have just suggested.
3.2. Approximate Value Function
It is convenient to deﬁne the target and trigger in logarithmic terms. Let lnQ∗
t denote the natural log
of the target (normalized) price and let lnQL
t and lnQH
t be the natural logs of the upper and lower
triggers. Under the Ss policy, the ﬁrm adjusts to lnQ∗
t if ln(Qt) 6∈ [lnQL
t ,lnQH
t ]. Our goal now is
to derive an approximate value function that leads a tractable (approximate) solution to the decision
problem
We begin by assuming that the ﬁxed cost of price adjustment b is second order. As is well known,
doing so implies that the range of inaction [lnQL
t ,lnQH
t ] is ﬁrst order (e.g. Mankiw (1985), Akerlof
and Yellen (1985)). This in turn implies that it is reasonable to restrict attention to a second order
12approximation of proﬁts.11
There is an important additional implication of our “small” b assumption: Second order b in
conjunction with the uniform distribution of the productivity shock implies that the continuation value
contingent on an idiosyncratic shock at date t +1is independent of Qt up to a second order.





order), and (b) φ>2(lnQH
t − lnQL
t ), then the expected value at date t of an optimal policy after an
idiosyncratic shock at date t +1 , E{e(ε−1)ξt+1v(Qteξt+1,Ωt+1)}, is independent of the current value of
Qt to a second order. In particular, the ﬁrm can treat its objective as
vn(Qt,Ωt)=Πt + αβEt {Λt,t+1v(Qt,Ωt+1)} + O3
The main insight of the proposition is that in future states where the idiosyncratic shock will





irrelevant to current pricing decision to a second order. This proposition has the ﬂavor of an envelope
theorem.
I nt h ea p p e n d i xw ep r o v i d eaf o r m a lp r o o fo ft h ep r o p o s i t i o n . H e r ew ep r e s e n tt h ei n t u i t i o n ,
which follows from Figure 1. Consider a ﬁrm with log normalized price equal to lnQt that re-
ceives an idiosyncratic shock in period t +1 . The shock leaves the ﬁrm log-uniformly distributed
between lnQt − φ/2 and lnQt + φ/2.N o w i n p e r i o d t +1the ﬁrm follows a pricing strategy char-
a c t e r i z e db yt h et r i p l e t{logQL
t+1,logQ∗
t+1,logQH
t+1}. Given this policy, lnQt+1 will be uniformly
distributed over (lnQL
t+1,lnQH
t+1) if the ﬁrm does not adjust (the dark gray region in Figure 1). If
the ﬁrm does adjust (the light gray regions of Figure 1), then lnQt+1 =l n Q∗




t+1} is independent of Qt (it depends only on the state at t +1 ), it follows
that the distribution of Qteξt+1 and hence v(Qteξt+1,Ωt+1) is independent of Qt. This can be seen
from Figure 1: A shift in lnQt, shifts the entire distribution of lnQt + ξt+1.T h i sd o e sn o ta ﬀect the
distribution after adjustment, only the states in which the ﬁrm adjusts up and the states in which the
ﬁrm adjusts down.





aﬀecting the correlation between Λt,t+1e(ε−1)ξt+1 and v(Qteξt+1,Ωt+1). However, given our restrictions
on b, this correlation is second order and its dependence on dependence on Qt is third order.
The proposition rests on two critical assumptions. The ﬁrst is that the idiosyncratic shock is
uniform and has a wide enough support that both price increases and price decreases are possible.
This assumption implies that the distribution of prices within the Ss bands is independent of Qt.T h e
second is that b is second order, which makes the correlation between the decision to change price and
Qt third order.




133.3. Approximate Optimal Pricing Policy
Armed with the preceding proposition, we now take a second-order approximation of the proﬁt function
about the frictionless optimal price. Let Qo
t be the optimal normalized price in the frictionless optimum
(i.e. the optimum with no adjustment costs.), then
Πt = χ1Yt (Wt/Pt)
1−ε − χ2Yt (Wt/Pt)
1−ε (lnQt − lnQo
t)
2 + O3 (3.7)
where χ1 and χ2 are constants, with χ2 = 1
2
ε1−ε
(ε−1)−ε, and O3 collects terms that are third order. Because
we are approximating the proﬁt function about the frictionless optimal price, the ﬁrst-order term is
zero.12 Given the elasticity of demand, Qo
t is simply a markup over the nominal wage:
Qo
t = µWt (3.8)
with µ = ε/(ε − 1).
Proposition 1 implies that we can ignore the continuation values in all states in which the idiosyn-
cratic shock arrives. Since the decision cost d implies ﬁrms only consider adjustment only following the
idiosyncratic shock, it follows that Q remains ﬁxed in all states in which the idiosyncratic shock does













+[terms independent of Qt]+O3 (3.9)
The ﬁrst term on the right-hand side gives the quadratic approximation to proﬁts in the states in which
the idiosyncratic shock does not hit. These are weighted by αi, the probability that there is no shock
for i periods in succession. The Q term in this expression is dated t since the normalized price remains
constant in these states.
It is now straightforward to derive the optimality conditions for the target and the two triggers.














The triggers in turn are given by a value matching condition that equates the gain from not adjusting
to the gain from adjustment, net the adjustment cost: For J = H,L :
v(QJ
t ,Ωt)=v(Q∗
t,Ωt) − b (3.11)
12Given that the ﬁrst-order term is zero implies that our linear-quadratic model will not be subject to the problems
described in Woodford (2002).



























Since we are interested in a local approximation about the steady state, we now analyze the non-
stochastic steady state as a necessary ﬁrst step.
3.4. Non-stochastic Steady State
We ﬁrst set the aggregate shocks at their respective means. The only disturbance in the steady state
is the idiosyncratic productivity shock, which washes out in the aggregate. We will use bars above
variables to indicate steady state values.
It is straightforward to derive the optimal steady state target and adjustment triggers. Given that
Pt and Wt are ﬁxed, it follows from the ﬁrst-order conditions (3.8) and (3.10) that the steady state
target price, ¯ Q∗,is a constant equal to the steady state frictionless optimal price ¯ Qo, as follows:
¯ Q∗ = ¯ Qo = µ ¯ W (3.13)
The steady state triggers are pinned down by the value matching condition with Pt and Wt at their
respective steady state means:
v( ¯ QJ, ¯ Ω)=v( ¯ Q∗, ¯ Ω) − b (3.14)







¡ ¯ W/¯ P
¢1−ε ¡
ln ¯ QJ − ln ¯ Qo¢2i
= b (3.15)
The solution to this quadratic equation yields two steady state triggers:
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The second equality follows from noting that ¯ W = µ ¯ P and substituting for χ2 and µ in terms of ε.
Note that since b is second order, the steady state bands ln ¯ QH −ln ¯ Q∗ and ln ¯ Q∗−ln ¯ QL are ﬁrst order
and symmetric, as we maintained earlier.
15The comparative statics of the Ss bands are straightforward. Increases in the menu cost b lead to
wider bands for the obvious reason. Increases in ε increase the concavity of the proﬁt function. This
increases the cost of deviations from the optimum and leads to narrower bands. Increases in ¯ Y allow
the menu cost to be spread over more units of output. This leads to narrower bands. Increases in α
allow the menu cost to be spread over a longer time horizon and thus to narrower bands.
Finally, the steady state probability of price adjustment conditional on an idiosyncratic shock is
1 −
ln ¯ QH+ln ¯ QL
φ .13 The unconditional probability of price adjustment, then is simply the product of
the probability of an idiosyncratic shock times the probability of adjusting conditional on this shock:
(1 − α) ·
³
1 −
ln ¯ QH+ln ¯ QL
φ
´
≡ 1 − θ. In the Calvo model, this frequency of price adjustment is taken
as a primitive. Here, the primitive is the frequency of idiosyncratic shocks. The frequency of price
adjustment depends on the likelihood of adjustment conditional on an idiosyncratic shock, where the
latter depends on the primitives of the model, including the distribution of idiosyncractic shocks, the
ﬁxed costs, and so on.
The average time a price is ﬁxed is simply the inverse of the frequency of price adjustment and is
given by 1/(1 −θ). Note that, in general, the average time a price is ﬁxed exceeds the average amount






(1 − α) ·
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This diﬀerence occurs because ﬁrms may choose to keep their prices ﬁx e di nt h ee v e n to fas h o c k .
Again, however, those ﬁrms that do not adjust in this instance will have their price within a ﬁrst order
of the target price.
3.5. Aggregate Shocks and Local Dynamics
We now consider (small) aggregate shocks to the steady state. Let lowercase letters represent log
deviations from steady state values, so that q∗
t =l n Q∗
t − ln ¯ Q∗
t and let wt =l n Wt − ln ¯ W.L o g -
linearizing (3.10) about the steady state values of P, W, Q0 and Q∗ :
q∗





=( 1 − βα)Et
∞ X
i=0
(βα)iwt+i + O2 (3.18)
since qo
t = wt. As in the pure time-dependent model, the target depends on a discounted stream of
future values of nominal marginal cost. In the time-dependent framework, however, future marginal
cost in each period is weighted by the probability that the price remains ﬁxed. In our state-dependent
13Since both ¯ q
H +¯ q
L and φ may be ﬁrst order
¡
ln ¯ Q
H +l n¯ Q
L¢
/φ n e e dn o ta p p r o a c hz e r oa st h eb approaches zero.
16framework, the relevant weight is the probability αi that a new idiosyncratic shock has not arisen,
which in general is a number smaller than the probability the price has stayed ﬁxed.14
We next consider the local dynamics for the optimal triggers. Log-linearizing (3.12) about the
steady state values of P, W, Q0 and Q∗ and using the deﬁnition (3.18) yields
qH
t = q∗
t +( 1− βα)






i [yt+i +( ε − 1)(wt+i − pt+i) − ct+i + ct] (3.19)
qL
t = q∗
t − (1 − βα)






i [yt+i +( ε − 1)(wt+i − pt+i) − ct+i + ct] (3.20)
Note that the width of the bands qH
t −qL
t may ﬂuctuate. However, given the quadratic proﬁt function,
they widen and contract symmetrically. Thus, given the uniform distribution, the average price within




t. This result will prove useful when we next consider the
local dynamics of the price level.15
3.6. Price Index











































14Note that we have taken two distinct approximations: a second-order appoximation of the ﬁrm’s value function and
a linearization of the ﬁrst order conditions. The ﬁrst approximation depends on the value of b. The second is in the
deviation of the aggregate variables from steady state. One can think of this as taking these two limits in succession.
First, choose b small enough such that the ﬁrms’ obectives are approximately quadratic. Second, choose an aggregate
forcing process that is small enough that it does not trigger further adjustment.
15The quadratic approximation of the proﬁt function leads to the symmetric bands. If we had log-linearized about the
exact solution to the ﬁrm’s problem in steady state, the bands would have been asymmetric, and we would have had to
introduce another state variable associated with the distribution of ﬁrms that did not adjust. Of course, this alternative
linearization diﬀers from ours by terms that are second order in Q.
17Now consider an island z that received an idiosyncratic shock at date t − i. Firms that adjusted at
that date set their price equal to q∗
t−i. Those that did not adjust remained uniformly distributed on
(qL
t−i,qH
t−i). Given (3.19) and (3.20), the average price of the non-adjusters is also q∗
t−i.H e n c e t h e
average price on island z is q∗
t−i. Given that the arrival rate of the shock is 1 − α, it follows that





which may be expressed as
pt =( 1− α)q∗
t + αpt−1 (3.24)
4. The Complete Model
In this section we put together the complete model. We restrict attention to a log-linear approximation
about the steady state. We begin with the “state-dependent” Phillips curve and then turn our attention
to the rest of the model.
Manipulation of (3.18) yields the optimal reset price q∗
t as the following discounted stream of future
nominal wages.
q∗





t depends on the island-speciﬁc wage wz,t+i. As a step toward aggregation, we would like
to derive this relation in terms of the economy-wide average wage, wt+i.
Log-linearizing the household’s ﬁrst-order condition for labor supply yields:
wz,t+i − pt+i = ϕnz,t+i + ct+i (4.2)
Averaging over this condition yields wt+i−pt+i = ϕnt+i+ct+i, implying the following relation between
the island z relative wage and the relative employment levels:
wz,t+i − wt+i = ϕ(nz,t+i − nt+i) (4.3)
Making use of the demand function and the production function leads to a relationship between the
relative wage and the relative price of ﬁrms that adjust at time t :
wz,t+i = wt+i − ϕε(q∗
t − pt+i) (4.4)
18Notice that wz,t+i depends inversely on q∗
t. Raising prices on an island reduces output and labor
demand. Since the labor market is segmented, it also reduces wages on the island, thus moderating
the need to raise prices in the ﬁrst place. As emphasized in Woodford (2003), this factor segmentation
thus introduces a strategic complementarity or “real rigidity” that gives adjusting ﬁrms a motive
to keep their relative prices in line with the relative prices of non-adjusting ﬁrms.16 This strategic
complementarity, in turn, contributes to the overall stickiness in the movement of prices. Combining
(4.4) with (4.1) yields
q∗







In equilibrium, the real wages of adjusting ﬁrms, wz,t − pt moves less than one for one with the
aggregate real wage, implying similarly sluggish movement in in the target price q∗
t. In this respect, the
strategic complementarity measured inversely by the coeﬃcient Ψ, dampens the adjustment of prices.
With economy-wide labor markets, Ψ equals unity, implying wz,t simply is equal to wt.
We are now in a position to present the Phillips curve. Let πt = pt − pt−1 denote inﬂation.
Combining the equation for the target price (4.5) with the price index (3.24) yields
πt = λ(wt − pt)+βEtπt+1 (4.7)
and
λ =
(1 − α)(1 − βα)
α
Ψ (4.8)
It should be clear that this state-dependent Phillips curve has the same form as the canonical time-
dependent Phillips curve as originally formulated by Calvo (1983). The key diﬀerence is that in our
formulation the primitive parameter entering the slope coeﬃcient on marginal cost is the probability
α of no idiosyncratic shock, whereas in the time-dependent framework it is the exogenously-given
probability of no price adjustment. In particular, for the time-dependent Phillips curve the slope
coeﬃcient, λtd is given by
λtd =
(1 − θ)(1 − βθ)
θ
Ψ (4.9)
where θ is the probability of no price adjustment, which is a primitive in the time-dependent framework.
Because in general α<θ(since a fraction of ﬁrms that receive an idiosyncratic shock may not
adjust), λ is greater than λtd. The implication is that inﬂation is more sensitive to movements in real
marginal cost in the state-dependent framework relative to the time-dependent model. This of course
is just another way of saying that state dependence leads to greater price ﬂexibility relative to time
16For a menu of alternative ways to introduce real rigidities, see Kimball (1995) and Woodford (2003).
19dependence. The intuition for this outcome follows directly from GL, which in turn comes from Caplin
and Spulber. Frequent idiosyncratic shocks give ﬁrms the option of also adjusting to aggregate shocks.
Unlike the time-dependent case, ﬁrms not adjusting are those that are already close to the target. Thus
in general, the state-dependent formulation will yield greater ﬂexibility than does the time dependent.
How much diﬀerence this makes, however, will depend upon the values of the primitive parameters of
the model.
The rest of the model is standard. Log-linearizing the ﬁrst order condition for labor supply, averag-
ing across households, and taking into account that consumption equals output, yields a linear relation
between the aggregate real wage and output.
wt − pt = κ(yt − y∗
t) (4.10)
where κ =( σ + ϕ) is the elasticity of marginal cost and y∗
t is the natural (ﬂexible price equilibrium)
level of output. Combining equations (4.7) and (4.10) then yields the Phillips curve in terms of the
output gap:
πt = λκ(yt − y∗
t)+βEtπt+1 (4.11)
Given that there are only consumption goods and utility is logarithmic, we can log-linearize the
household’s intertemporal condition to obtain the following “IS” curve:
yt = −(rn
t − Etπt+1)+Etyt+1 (4.12)
Next, log-linearizing the ﬁrst-order condition for money demand and taking into account that
consumption equals output yields:
mt − pt = yt − ζrn
t (4.13)
Equations (4.11), (4.12) and (4.13) determine the equilibrium aggregate dynamics, conditional on
a monetary policy rule (and given the deﬁnition, pt = πt + pt−1). To illustrate the model dynamics in
a way that sharpens the focus on the issue of how state versus time dependence aﬀects the degree of
nominal stickiness, we close the model with a simple money growth rule:
mt − mt−1 = ηm
t (4.14)
where ηm
t is a mean zero i.i.d. exogenous shock to the evolution of the money stock.
Both recent empirical work and conventional wisdom hold that central banks use the nominal
interest rate rather than a monetary aggregate as the instrument of monetary policy We accordingly
also explore closing the model with an interest rate rule of the following form:
20rn




t is a mean zero i.i.d. exogenous shock to the evolution of the money stock
5. Properties of the Model
Before proceeding to some numerical exercises with the model, we ﬁrst characterize some general
properties. We begin by noting that our model is consistent with Klenow and Kryvstov’s (2003)
evidence on the decomposition of inﬂation. In particular, these authors show that for the recent low
inﬂation decade in the U.S.: (i) the proportion of ﬁrms that adjust their prices has fairly constant
a n dt h a t( i i )t h ev a r i a t i o ni nt h ei n ﬂation has driven almost entirely by variation in the size of price
adjustment, not by variation in the frequency of price adjustment. The local approximation of our
model has this property, even though it allows for state-dependent pricing. In particular, within the
local approximation, the proportion of ﬁrms adjusting their price in any given period is practically
constant. In particular, the fraction of ﬁrms that keep their prices ﬁxed is equal to









In general the ﬂuctuations in qH
t and qL
t will be quite small (see equations (3.19) and (3.20)), implying
that movements in the fraction of ﬁrms that adjust 1 − θt is quite small. Moreover, these movements
have no eﬀect on inﬂation, which depends only on the target q∗ not the triggers qH
t and qL
t . Fluctuations
i nt h er a t eo fi n ﬂation are thus entirely explained by variation in the size of price adjustments, as in
the standard time-dependent framework.
Second, we note that our state-dependent formulation of inﬂation is quite ﬂexible: At one extreme
the model can generate the kind of complete ﬂexibility suggested by Caplin and Spulber. At the other,
it can perfectly mimic the degree of nominal stickiness in the pure time-dependent Calvo model.
When the Ss bands are small relative to φ,m o s tﬁrms adjust in response to an idiosyncratic shock
and α ∼ θ. In this case our Ss model behaves exactly like the Calvo model: The slope coeﬃcients on
marginal cost in the respective Phillips curves are identical in each case.
In the other extreme, when α =1our model behaves exactly like a ﬂexible price model: The slope
coeﬃcient on marginal cost in the Ss Phillips curve goes to inﬁnity. In this case, the idiosyncratic
productivity shock hits each ﬁrm each period. According to (3.18), q∗
t = qo
t, and according to (3.23),
the price index is equal to qo
t as well. The economy is always at its frictionless optimum. Money is
neutral. Neutrality holds in spite of the fact that a fraction θ of ﬁrms do not adjust their prices in each
period.17
17Note that Danziger does not ﬁnd neutrality in his model even though he assumes that N =1 . The reason is that
21W h a ti st h es o u r c eo ft h i sn e u t r a l i t y ?I ti si n s t r u ctive to analyze it both from the perspective of a
ﬁrm and from the economy as a whole. Consider ﬁrst a ﬁrm that is contemplating price adjustment. It
faces an expected path for the nominal wage. In a time-dependent model, the ﬁrm would set its price
equal to a mark up over a weighted average of future wages where the weights represent the discounted
probability that the ﬁrm has not yet had an opportunity to alter its price. The weights would be of
the form (βθ)
i . How can the state-dependent ﬁrm ignore the future path of wages and set its price as
a markup only of the current wage? The answer is that the state-dependent ﬁrm can use its future
price adjustment decision to bring its costs in line with whatever price it sets today. Suppose that
the wage rises in the next period. A time-dependent ﬁrm would ﬁnd that its price is too low. The
state-dependent ﬁrm shifts the set of productivities for which it maintains its price so that its average
markup is unchanged. The resulting distribution of markups is unaﬀected by the increase in the wage.
It is important to note that this stark neutrality result depends crucially on the assumption of a uniform
distribution with wide support and that the shock hits the ﬁrm each period. This assumption allows
the ﬁrm each period to alter its adjustment triggers without altering the resulting distribution of the
markups.
From the perspective of the economy as a whole, this neutrality result is similar to the neutrality
result of Caplin and Spulber. In Caplin and Spulber, an increase in the nominal wage causes a few
ﬁrms to raise their prices by a discrete amount, so that the aggregate real wage remains constant. Here
what changes is the mix of ﬁrms that raise and lower their prices. When a shock causes the nominal
wage to rise, the set of ﬁrms that maintain their prices ﬁxed changes. Some that had marginally low
productivities decide to raise their prices and some that have marginally high productivities decide
not to lower theirs. The result is an unchanging distribution of markups: uniform between two ﬁxed
triggers, and a ﬁxed mass at the target.
In the general case where a subset of ﬁrms each period do not get hit with an aggregate shock
(0 <α<1), the slope coeﬃcient λ is less than inﬁnity, implying nominal stickiness at the aggregate
level. In this instance, monetary policy will aﬀect the distribution of markups. How important these
eﬀects are depends on the model calibration. We turn to this issue next.
6. Calibration and Some Simulations
In this section we explore the response of the model economy to a monetary shock as a way to evaluate
the eﬀects of Ss pricing. We begin by calibrating the model. Where possible we choose standard
parameters. The time period is a quarter. We set the discount rate β at .99 and the coeﬃcient of
relative risk aversion σ at 1.0. We set the elasticity of substitution between goods, ε, equal to 11,w h i c h
implies a steady state markup of 10 percent. We set the Frisch elasticity of labor supply (the inverse of
he presents an exact analytic solution, whereas we log-linearize. The eﬀects of money on output that Danziger ﬁnds are
second order in our framework.
22ϕ)a t1.0, which is a reasonable intermediate range value in the literature. Finally, we set the interest
elasticity of money demand ν = .1.
Next we turn to the key parameters of price adjustment: the probability of no idiosyncratic shock,
α, the density of the idiosyncratic shock, φ, the adjustment relative to average steady state ﬁrm output,
b/Y.Note ﬁrst that the steady state Ss band ω =l n¯ Q−ln ¯ Qo is a function of these parameters: From





¯ Y . The average size of price adjustment will depend on ω and the range of
the idiosyncratic productivity shock (which depends on φ). In turn, the frequency of price adjustment
1−θ equals (1−α)(1− 2ω
φ ),w h e r e1− 2ω
φ is the probability of adjustment conditional on an aggregate
shock. We can then proceed to derive a system of relations that pin down the triplet (α,φ,b/Y ),u s i n g
evidence on: (i) the frequency of price adjustment; (ii )t h ea b s o l u t es i z eo fp r i c ea d j u s t m e n t s ;a n d( i i i ) ;
the costs of price adjustment.
Klenow and Kryvtsov (2003) report that the median time a price is ﬁxed is slightly over four months.
Accordingly we ﬁx the average frequency of price adjustment price adjustment at (1−α)(1− 2ω
φ )=0 .4,
which yields a median duration of prices of 1.36 quarters or 4.1 months.18 Next we require that the
model match Klenow and Kryvtsov’s evidence that the average absolute size of price adjustments is
about 8.0 percent: This implies
φ
4 + ω
2 = .08. Finally, we set the steady state resources devoted to price
adjustment equal to 0.4 percent of revenue, based on the evidence in Zbaracki et al. (2004).19 This
implies b/¯ Y = .004/[(1 − α)(1 − 2ω
φ )].
Table 1 shows the values of α,φ,b/¯ Y,and ω implied by this parameterization, as well as 1 − 2ω
φ ,
the probability of price adjustment conditional on the idiosyncratic shock. Note that φ>4ω implying
that the support of the idiosyncratic shock is large enough that the idiosyncratic shock leads to both
price increases and price decreases.20
Table 2 shows implied value of λ, the slope the coeﬃcient on marginal cost in Phillips curve given
by equation (4.7). For comparison, we also report the implied slope coeﬃcient for a conventional
time-dependent Calvo formulation λtd, with a similar frequency of price adjustment. The respective
18As Cogley and Sbordone (2005) note, given adjustment is binom i a lr a n d o mv a r i a b l e ,t h et i m eu n t i lt h en e x ta d j u s t m e n t
can be approximated as an continuous time exponential random variable, implying a median waiting time equal to
−ln(2)/ln(θ). Note that the median waiting time is less than the mean duration of prices (1/0.4=2 .5 quarters, roughly
seven and a half months) since the exponential distribution implies that some prices may not change for a very long time.
19Zbaracki et al. (2004) quantify the physical costs of price adjustment for a large manufacturing ﬁrm. Levy et al. (1997)
in a study of four grocery stores ﬁnd that resources devoted to the price adjustment are slightly higher, approximately 0.7
percent of revenue. GL, on the other hand, ﬁnd that a value of 0.24 allows their model to best match certain properties
of the data. Our quantitative results are robust to either of these alternative values.
20It is often noted that the size of price adjustment that we observe in the data is not constant, as it would be
i nac o n t i n u o u st i m eS sm o d e lw i t has t a t i o n a r ya n dc o n t i n uous forcing process. We see both large and small price
adjustments in the data. This model is consistent with this observation. The largest price adjustment, φ/2+ω ∼ 16%,
occurs when a ﬁrm at the edge of the band receives a shock of size φ/2. The smallest adjustment is ω ∼ 3%. In the
current parameterization the former is ﬁve times the latter. The reason that this model generates both large and small
adjustment is that the shock process is discontinuous.
23formulation for the two cases are given by.
λ =




(1 − θ)(1 − βθ)
θ(1 + ϕε)
where in each case, the term 1/(1+ϕε) reﬂects the inﬂuence of the strategic complementarity stemming
from local labor markets21. For comparison, we also report slope coeﬃcients for the case where real
rigidities are absent (global labor markets). In this case ϕ =0 .L e taλ denote the case without real
rigidities. The respective slope coeﬃcients are then:
λ =




(1 − θ)(1 − βθ)
θ
For the case with local labor markets (ϕ =1 ) ,t h es l o p ec o e ﬃcient is .053 for our Ss model, while
for the Calvo model the parameter shrinks to about .023. λ exceeds λtd by a factor of two, indicating
greater nominal ﬂexibility with state dependence. However, the absolute diﬀerence is small. Further,
λ lies within the range of estimates reported by Gali and Gertler (1999). Eliminating real rigidities
raises both λ and λtd by a factor of 12. In this case the absolute diﬀerence between the two cases is
large. However, both slope coeﬃcients lie well above estimates in the literature.
We next consider the response of the model economy to an unanticipated monetary shock. We
begin with the case where monetary policy is governed by the simple money growth rule deﬁned in
equation (4.14) and where real rigidities are absent. This scenario corresponds closest to the policy
experiment considered by Golosov and Lucas (2005). Figure 2 illustrates the response of the model
economy to a permanent 1 percent decrease in the money stock. The solid line is the response of our
state-dependent pricing model, while the dotted line shows the response of the time-dependent Calvo
model. For the state-dependent model there is only a transitory decrease in real output that lasts
about three quarters. The initial response of the price level, further, is slightly greater in percentage
terms than the response of real output, suggesting considerable nominal ﬂexibility. Indeed, consistent
with the ﬁndings of GL, the state-dependent model also exhibits greater nominal ﬂexibility than does
the Calvo model. For the Calvo model, the initial output response is roughly 20 percent larger and
the overall response lasts several quarters longer. Conversely, the overall movement in the price level
is smaller.
Figure 2 clearly illustrates the eﬀect of the absence of complementarities. The optimal target price
21Introducing other complementarities such as ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital (Woodford 2005) or a chain of production (Basu
1995) may reduce this parameter further.
24q∗ immediately falls by 1 percent, mimicking the path followed by the money supply. There is no eﬀect
of the ﬁrms that do not change their prices on the ﬁr m st h a td o . B yt h et i m et h a ta l lﬁrms have
adjusted, the transition to the new steady state is complete.
When we add complementarities in the form of local labor markets, it is still the case that the
state-dependent model exhibits the most ﬂexibility, but the percentage diﬀerence from the Calvo model
becomes smaller. Figure 3 illustrates the response of the model economy for this case. As we would
expect, there is a stronger response of output and a weaker response of the price level for both the
state- and time-dependent models. For the state-dependent model, the percentage output response is
now roughly triple the response of the price level. Further, output does not return to trend for over ten
quarters. Importantly, the addition of real rigidities reduces the percentage diﬀerence in the output
response across the state- and time-dependent models. Now, for example the initial output response
for the state-dependent model is only about 10 percent less than for the Calvo model.
We can see the eﬀect of the complementarities in the response of q∗. The initial response of the
target price is only half the size of the money shock and it takes about 10 quarters for q∗ to adjust
to steady state. In this case even after the majority of ﬁrms have adjusted their prices, the economy
will not have returned to steady state. Some of these ﬁrms will have adjusted to a non-steady state
price. This is the source of sluggishness in the price level that generates greater and more persistent
real eﬀects of money.
The simple exogenous process for monetary policy given by equation (4.14) is useful for illustrating
the degree of nominal inertia in the model, but is not an empirically reasonable characterization of
central bank behavior. A vast recent literature suggests that simple interest rate rules in the spirit of
equation (4.15) provide a better characterization of central bank policy for industrialized economies
than do money growth rules. We accordingly reconsider money shock experiment, replacing equation
(4.14) with equation (4.15) in the model economy. In line with recent estimates (e.g. Clarida, Gali and
Gertler (2000)), we set the coeﬃcient on inﬂation at 1.5 and the interest rate smoothing parameter at
0.7.
Figure 4 reports the impulse responses of the model economy to an unanticipated 100 basis point
increase in the short-term interest rate, for the case with local labor markets. Note that for the Ss
model there is a sharp decline in real output that lasts nearly a year. There is relatively little movement
in the price level, a reﬂection that under the interest rate policy the money supply reverts at least part
of the way back to trend. As always, the Calvo model exhibits more nominal stickiness, but the relative
diﬀerences in the behavior of output and inﬂation are small in percentage terms. More signiﬁcantly,
however, with complementarities present, the Ss model is capable of generating considerable nominal
stickiness.
To be sure, while our model is useful for exploring the implications of state-dependent pricing
and is capable of capturing qualitatively the relative strong response of output and weak response
of inﬂation to a monetary policy shock, it is clearly too simple to closely match the evidence (e.g.
25Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005)). For example, it cannot capture the delayed and hump-
shaped response of real output. On the other hand, it is straightforward to add a number of features
(e.g., habit formation, investment with delays and adjustment costs, and so on) that have proved useful
in improving the empirical performance of such models.
7. Conclusion
We have developed a simple macroeconomic framework that features an analytically tractable Phillips
curve relation based on state-dependent pricing. At the micro level, ﬁrms face idiosyncratic shocks
and ﬁxed costs of adjusting price. We cut through the usual diﬃculties in solving and aggregating
Ss models with restrictions on the distribution of idiosyncratic shocks and also by focusing on a local
approximation around a zero inﬂation steady state, as is done in the time-dependent pricing literature.
In the end, our model is able to match the micro evidence on the frequency and size of price adjustment.
At the same time, the resulting Phillips curve is every bit as tractable as the Calvo relation based on
time-dependent pricing.
Consistent with the numerical exercises in Golosov and Lucas (2005), we ﬁnd that for a given
frequency of price adjustment, the Ss model exhibits greater nominal ﬂexibility than a corresponding
time-dependent framework, due to a selection eﬀect: Firms farthest away from target adjust in the
Ss model, while this is not the case within the time-dependent framework. However, with the intro-
duction of real rigidities, our Ss model is capable of generating considerable nominal stickiness, as we
demonstrate with a simple calibration model.
While our model is capable of capturing the basic features of the micro data, it is too simple at
this stage to capture the cyclical dynamics of output and inﬂation. It is straightforward to add some
features that have proved useful in explaining performance, such as habit formation, investment and
adjustment costs. Accounting for the persistence of inﬂation may prove trickier, given that the simple
Calvo model also has diﬃculty on this account. Speciﬁcally, the evidence suggests that a hybrid Phillips
curve that allows for lagged inﬂation as well as expected future inﬂation to aﬀect inﬂation dynamics
is preferred over the pure forward-looking model.22 However, at this point we suspect that some of
strategies employed in the time-dependent literature to address this problem, such as dynamic indexing,
information lags and/or learning may prove useful in this context as well.
22For example, Gali and Gertler (1999) ﬁnd that a hybrid model with a coeﬃcient of roughly 0.65 on expected future
inﬂation and 0.35 on lagged inﬂation is preferred over the pure forward-looking model.
268. Appendix: Proofs
P r o o fo ft h eL e m m a3 . 1 :We prove the lemma in two parts. In the ﬁrst part, we show that there
exists a neighborhood of the steady state in which the ﬁrm would never choose to pay the decision cost
if the idiosyncratic shock did not hit. In the second part, we show that the ﬁrm would always choose
to pay the decision cost should the idiosyncratic shock hit.
The ﬁrst part of the proof is constructive. Fix a date t and a ﬁrm j. W es u p p o s et h a ta l lﬁrms
in the economy are following the strategy of paying the decision cost if and only if they are hit by




s }. We suppose that at t, ﬁrm j does not receive the idiosyncratic shock. We show that j
chooses not to pay the decision cost.
Suppose that the ﬁrm last experienced an idiosyncratic shock at date s<t . By assumption, the
ﬁrm paid the decision cost at that date and as a consequence learned the state of the world. Let Ωs,t
denote the ﬁrms information at date t based on information collected at date s. Ωs,t contains all of the
aggregate variables, as well as the idiosyncratic shock at date s. By assumption, no idiosyncratic shock
has hit the ﬁrm since s and the ﬁrm has not adjusted its price; therefore the ﬁrm knows it current
normalized price and it is Qs.
Let v(Qs,Ωs,t) denote the optimal policy given the normalized price Qs and the information Ωs,t.
We describe the ﬁrm’s decision in three steps. The ﬁrst step is whether or not to pay the decision cost.
We have
v(Qs,Ωs,t)=m a x {E [ˆ v(Qs,Ωt,t)|Ωs,t] − d,E[Πt(Qs)+βΛt,t+1v(Qs,Ωs,t+1)|Ωs,t],}
If the ﬁrm pays the decision cost d, then it receives the expected value of ˆ v(Qt,Ωt,t),w h e r eˆ v(Qs,Ωt,t)
is the value after having paid the decision cost of receiving the updated information Ωt,t and having the
option to alter its price from Qs. This expectation is taken with respect to the current information Ωs,t.
If the ﬁrm does not pay the decision cost, then it cannot alter its price, it receives the expected proﬁt
Πt(Qs) deﬁned in equation (3.2) and the discounted value of v(Qt,Ωs,t+1), where here the information
is one period older. Again the expectation is taken with respect to Ωs,t.
Proceeding to the second step, the ﬁrm that pays the decision cost has the option of altering its
price
ˆ v(Qs,Ωt,t)=m a x {¯ v(Qs,Ωt,t),max
Q
¯ v(Q,Ωt,t) − b}
where ¯ v (as in the text) is the value after having made the pricing decision. As the ﬁnal step, we deﬁne
¯ v:
¯ v(Q,Ωt,t)=Πt + βE{Λt,t+1v(Q,Ωt,t+1)|Ωt,t}
Now, by assumption, lnQs ∈ [qL
s ,qH
s ], since the ﬁrm last paid the decision cost in period s.R e c a l l
the ﬁrm cannot adjust without paying d.T h eﬁrst thing to note is that in steady state j would never
27pay the decision cost at t. The reason is that in steady state qj ∈ [¯ qL, ¯ qH] which is within b of the
optimum. Paying the decision cost would only make sense if the ﬁrm wanted to adjust its price, but
then the total cost of adjustment would be b+d>b . Paying the extra d would only make sense if there
were some extra value to paying the decision cost beyond the option of price adjustment. In steady
state, this is only the case in the event of the idiosyncratic shock.
Now suppose that the aggregate shocks are small enough that they keep the ﬁrm in a neighborhood
of the steady state lnQs ∈ [qL
s ,qH
s ] ⊂ [¯ qL −δ1, ¯ qH +δ1] with probability 1−δ2 for some δ1,δ2 > 0 and
all s. Note the loss to non-adjustment in period t for a ﬁrm with normalized price Qs relative to a ﬁrm
at qL





t)2] (with probability 1− δ2)A s
the aggregate shock shrinks to zero, δ1 and δ2 approach zero as well, and the diﬀerence between these
losses also approaches zero. Since the loss to non-adjustment at qL
t is b, there exists a neighborhood of
the steady state in which the loss to non-adjustment is less than b + d. This establishes the ﬁrst part
of the proposition.
To establish the second part, consider the steady state and a ﬁrm with the optimal price. It is
easy to show that any other ﬁrm would have a strictly greater desire to pay the decision cost in steady
state. Arguments similar to the ﬁrst part show that outside steady state, the cost to not paying the
decision cost will be in a neighborhood of the steady state cost. Suppose that this ﬁrm receives an
idiosyncratic shock. The ﬁrm compares the cost of inaction until the next idiosyncratic shock to the
beneﬁt of learning the state and acting optimally. Should the latter exceed the former by more than
the decision cost, the ﬁrm will choose the latter. This diﬀerence is equal to







If the ﬁrm learns that the idiosyncratic shock is less than ω, it will not adjust and there is no diﬀerence






over the period until the next price adjustment. This beneﬁt is integrated
with respect to the density 1/φ to the maximum shock φ/2.T h e 2 comes from the symmetry of
the problem: whatever happens at the upper trigger, happens at the lower trigger. This expression
simpliﬁes to









Therefore if the decision cost is less than the bound stated in the Lemma, the ﬁrm would choose to
pay the decision cost in the event of an idiosyncratic shock. This establishes the second part of the
argument and completes the proof of the lemma. QED
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 . 2 :Suppose that the ﬁrm has a current level of Qt such that lnQt ∈
[lnQL
t ,lnQH
t ]. We are interested in the expected value of an optimal policy conditional on an idiosyn-
28cratic productivity shock in period t+1.A l s ol e tQ∗
t+1 denote the optimal choice of Qt+1 in the event
of adjustment.
Consider E{Λt,t+1e(ε−1)ξt+1v(Qteξt+1,P t+1,W t+1)} over the states of the world in which the idio-
syncratic shock hits. Given the assumption on φ, ξH >q H


















































A change of variable, Φt+1 =l nQt + ξt+1,g i v e s :
E{Λt,t+1e(ε−1)ξt+1 Λt,t+1(Q∗




















t+1 are chosen optimally in period t+1.T h e yd e p e n do nt h ep e r i o dt+1
state. eΦt+1 and the aggregate variables are independent of Qt. The only place that Qt enters is in the
exponential term inside the integral. Now, by the assumption on b, lnQt is equal to lnQ∗
t plus a ﬁrst
order term and, given the limits of integration, Φt+1 is equal to lnQ∗
t+1 plus a ﬁrst-order term. The
exponential term is therefore equal to e(ε−1)(lnQ∗
t+1−lnQ∗
t) plus a ﬁrst-order term. The term in square
brackets inside the integral is bounded by b. By the assumption on b, this term is second order. Hence:
Λt,t+1e(ε−1)(Φt+1−lnQt) £










29Further, the assumption that φ>2(lnQH
t − lnQL






















where the integral is second or third order (it is second order if φ is ﬁrst order and third order if φ is
ﬁxed independently of b). It follows that E{e(ε−1)ξt+1v(Qteξt+1,P t+1,W t+1)} is independent of Qt to a
second order. QED
9. Appendix: On the accuracy of the approximation
We have made a number of approximations and assumptions in order to arrive at an analytically
tractable model. Theoretically our approximation holds if (1) the idiosyncratic shocks are dispersed
enough that ﬁrms always expect that both price increases and decreases are possible; (2) The Ss bands
are small enough that the second-order approximation of the proﬁt function is valid and the continuation
value following an idiosyncratic shock is third order; (3) the aggregate shocks are suﬃciently small that
the log-linearization is accurate. In this appendix, we evaluate the ﬁrst of two assumptions. The third
is standard in the literature on Calvo pricing. We also evaluate whether removing the decision cost has
a large eﬀect on the model’s dynamics. To summarize, the model holds up well.
9.1. Idiosyncratic shocks
The wide distribution of idiosyncratic shocks greatly simpliﬁes the solution to the model. In the limit,
as the variance of the aggregate shock shrinks to zero, the condition φ>4ω assumed in equation
(2.11) is suﬃcient to ensure that some ﬁrms raise their prices while others lower their prices. Away
from steady state, we also need the range of the idiosyncratic shock to be wide enough to compensate
for movements in the bands caused by aggregate shocks. Fortunately, we have a lot of leeway on this
dimension. In our calibration, φ = .254,w h e r e a s4ω = .132. In the simulations the eﬀect of a monetary
shock on the position of the bands is essentially the same as the eﬀect of a shock on the desired price.
Since this latter eﬀect is considerably less than ω, there is ample room for the idiosyncratic shock to
compensate for movements in the bands.
9.2. Third-order terms in the approximation
We take a quadratic approximation of the period proﬁt function. This requires that third-order terms
a r en e g l i g i b l er e l a t i v et ot h es e c o nd-order terms. To evaluate this assumption, we compute the ratio of
the third-order term in the proﬁt function to the second-order term. We use our calibrated parameters
30and evaluate lnQ−lnQ∗ at the steady-state value for the bands. The ratio is .21. Hence it is not obvious
that the third-order terms are small.23 Below, we solve a non-linear version of the ﬁrm’s problem and
ﬁnd that these terms do aﬀect the steady state position of the bands, but have a negligible eﬀect on
the dynamics of the price level relative to steady state.
9.3. The continuation value following idiosyncractic shocks
When we took the second-order approximation of the value function we ignored all terms involving the
arrival of the idiosyncratic shock. According to Proposition 1, these terms were third order. We now
show that these terms are indeed small in our calibration.
Note that we can rewrite equation (8.1) as follows
E{Λt,t+1e(ε−1)ξt+1v(Qteξt+1,P t+1,W t+1)}
















where C and the coeﬃcient on e−(ε−1)lnQt are independent of Qt. Taking a second-order approximation




















Now the term in square brackets is bounded above by b.W ec a ng e ts o m ei d e ao fh o wl a r g et h i s
coeﬃcient is by replacing the term in brackets by b and evaluating it at the steady-state values of the
other variables. The result is .13¯ Y . To get an idea of how large is the eﬀe c tt h a tw eh a v eo m i t t e df r o m
our approximation of the value function, we need to multiply this by β(1 − α)/(1 − αβ) in order to
account for all of the times that this term enters the present value calculation (The term appears in
period t+i with probability (1−α)αi−1). The resulting coeﬃcient is .129¯ Y . This should be compared
with the coeﬃcient on (lnQ − lnQ∗)












Given the parameters in our calibration this is equal to 5¯ Y . It follows that the omitted terms are indeed
small relative to the terms that we include. For our parameterization the coeﬃcient on the continuation
value following the idiosyncratic shock is an order of magnitude smaller than the coeﬃcient on proﬁts
prior to the shock.
23Devereux and Siu (2004) argue in another context that these third order terms may be quantitatively important.
319.4. The decision cost
The introduction of the decision cost d solves a particular technical problem in the linearization. Ss
models have threshold rules that make them diﬃcult to linearize. Without the decision cost, a ﬁrm
with Qt in the neighborhood of QH
t will want to adjust in period t+1if QH falls and not adjust if QH
rises. Since the price index is equal to the average of lnQ. This creates a non-diﬀerentiability of the
price index in the neighborhood of the steady state: shocks in one direction may trigger adjustment,
while shocks in the other direction may not. When the idiosyncratic productivity shock hits, this non-
diﬀerentiability does not matter, the idiosyncratic shock smooths it out. We introduce the decision
cost to eliminate this non-diﬀerentiabilty in other states of the world.24
In the model, the decision cost only aﬀects the calculation of the bands qH and qL, and these bands
were only used in the calculation of the price index. We did not need the decision cost for Proposition
3.1, since that proposition considered only states of the world in which the idiosyncratic shock arrived.
We did not need the decision cost for the calculation of the optimal target q∗.S i n c et h eb a n d sa r ew i d e
relative to the aggregate ﬂuctuations, ﬁrms at the target rarely reach the bands before they receive
another idiosyncratic shock.
We can get some idea of how the decision cost aﬀects the aggregate dynamics by considering
how ﬁrms might want to adjust if we removed the decision cost. In this experiment, we set the
decision cost equal to zero. We consider a 1 percent reduction in the money supply.25 We assume
that the aggregate variables follow the paths predicted by our model. We calculate the optimal non-
linear adjustment policies, given perfect foresight of the response of the aggregate variables and the
quadratic approximation of the proﬁt function (3.7). We then calculate a new price index using equation
from (3.22) by assuming that the distribution of prices begins in steady state and then iterating the
constructed optimal policies. We can judge the eﬀect of the decision cost by comparing this price index
to that predicted by our model.
Figure 5 presents this comparison. The two price paths are very close. Eliminating the decision
cost has very little eﬀect on the price level.
To see why this is so, consider the period of the shock. The lnq are initially distributed uniformly
over [−0.30,0.30]. After the shock the barriers fall to 0.24 and −0.33. Without the decision cost
those left in the interval [0.24,0.30] want to adjust. With the decision cost they do not. How large
an eﬀect does this have? Recall that only α of the ﬁrms originally in this interval remain. A fraction
α(qH
0 − qH
1 )/φ,o r1p e r c e n t ,o fﬁrms are aﬀected by the decision cost. These ﬁrms charge q∗
1 = .005
rather than the average of qH
0 and qH
1 . This implies an average price change of 2.7 percent. The price
24DKW eliminate these non-diﬀerentiabilities by introducing idiosyncratic cost shocks. We cannot do this, since the
distributon of prices for ﬁrms who last received the idiosyncratic shock at date t but chose not to adjust, would no




t . It would be a convolution of this uniform distribuiton and the additional
idiosyncratic shock.
25The Ss bands contract when the money supply falls. Hence reductions in the money supply lead to more adjustment
than do increases. A reduction in the money supply is therefore a stronger test of the eﬀect of the decision cost.
32levels therefore diﬀer by .01*.027∼.0003. The diﬀerence is an order of magnitude smaller than the
change in the price level which is just under 0.3 percent. It is even smaller in subsequent periods since
t h ep o l i c i e sm o v eb yl e s s .
Larger monetary shocks reproduce Figure 5 on a larger scale. The two impulse response look exactly
the same, only the vertical axis changes. Once the money shock exceeds 5 percent the model begins to
break down. Firms initially at lnq∗
0 may ﬁnd themselves outside of the bands. This has a big eﬀect on
the performance of the model.
As one ﬁnal check on the model, we repeated the experiment in Figure 5, but this time we replaced
the quadratic approximation of the proﬁt function with the exact proﬁt funtions (3.1). Figure 6 shows
the resulting impluse response. It is very close to the linear model. This does not mean that the third
order terms do not have any eﬀect. They do impact the position of the bands relative to the optimal
price. In the linear model, ω =3 .3 percent. With the exact proﬁt function, the upper band is equal
to 3.77 percent, whereas the lower band is equal to 2.97 percent. These diﬀerences have only a minor
eﬀect on the dynamics of the model, because the dynamics depend on the movements in the bands not
the position of the bands.
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Figure 1: A Firm’s Response to a Productivity Shock 
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